This paper contains additional details about the model in our paper "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers" (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004) ), as well as the computational methods we use to solve and estimate the model, and the construction of the data set.
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In this paper, we give additional details about the model in our paper "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers" (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004) ), as well as the computational methods we use to solve and estimate the model, and the construction of the data set.
In our model, we assume that politicians make decisions about running for reelection, running for higher office, and exiting from Congress (either to retirement or another type of work) every two years-the length of a House term. Politicians are forward looking, and realize that current decisions will affect the distribution of future payoffs. Thus, they must solve a dynamic optimization problem to determine the current decision that maximizes expected present value of lifetime utility. We assume that politicians' behavior can be represented as if they solve a discrete choice dynamic programming (DP) problem to arrive at optimal current period decisions. This means we must solve that DP problem ourselves in order to form the likelihood function for the model (see, e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Rust (1994) ).
In order to solve the DP problem we use a standard backsolving procedure. We assume that the earliest age at which a person can be elected to Congress is 30 and if a politician lives to age 80, then he/she must exit Congress at that point. 1 These assumptions imply that the dynamic optimization problem has (at most) 25 decision periods. Furthermore, it greatly simplifies our analysis to assume that exit from Congress is an absorbing state-that is, the politician cannot return to Congress after leaving, regardless of the age at which he or she exits.
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When a politician exits Congress (either voluntarily or via electoral defeat), he/she chooses between two post-congressional career options or retirement. We do not model choice behavior after that point. Exogenous death and retirement transition rates govern the expected present value of each post-congressional option.
The presentation of our model and of the technical issues related to its solution and estimation can usefully be decomposed into several parts. These are: (i) post-congressional payoffs; (ii) the decisions of senators; (iii) the decisions of representatives; (iv) probability functions and the evolution of exogenous state variables; (v) computational issues; and (vi) the likelihood function. We now describe these in turn.
Post-Congressional Payoffs
At the end of each two-year period, a politician who is in Congress has the option of exiting. A key feature of our model is that, when a politician exits from Congress, he/she can choose between two post-congressional employment options, or else retire. The employment options are (i) work in a private sector occupation, or (ii) work in a public sector occupation (i.e., enter another political job). By other political jobs we are thinking primarily of appointed positions that the politician may be offered, such as cabinet posts, bureaucratic positions, etc.
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The wage the politician would receive in each of the two alternatives is determined by the politician's age, education, and variables characterizing his/her congressional experience. We specify log wage functions that are similar in functional form to those postulated in the human capital literature (Mincer (1958) ), except for the inclusion of the congressional experience variables. Assume the wage functions take the form:
(1) Here, W ijt is the wage offered to individual i in occupation j in period t, for j = 1,2, and t = 1,…,25. Note that t indexes two-year increments in age from 32 through 80. Since we present the decision process for an individual i, we do not need separate age and calendar time subscripts.
This specification allows for the possibility that individuals have different unobserved endowments of skill for each occupation (as in Keane and Wolpin (1997) ). The variable Skill i indexes the (unobserved) endowment vectors and is simply a dummy variable equal to 1 if the (unobserved) type of politician i is "skilled." The case where the dummy variable Skill i = 0 corresponds to the default or "normal" type. The error term ε ijt represents the purely stochastic component of the wage offer, which is revealed when the politician exits Congress.
Turning to the observables in the wage function, BA i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i has a bachelor's degree and zero if not, and JD i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if he/she has a law degree and zero otherwise. TH it and TS it are the number of prior terms served in the House and Senate, respectively. COM it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, during the prior term in the House, a representative had served on a major House committee. 4 Political scientists typically define the major House committees as Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules (see, e.g., Deering and Smith (1990) ). The idea here is that service on one of these major committees may augment the human capital one brings to post-congressional employment. For example, being a member of the Ways and Means committee might generate knowledge that would enhance one's value as a lobbyist for companies trying to obtain tax breaks.
Finally, VE it is an indicator function for whether the politician exited Congress voluntarily rather than via losing an election bid. Our rationale for including this variable in the wage function is that the mode of exit (i.e., voluntarily or by losing), may affect the value of the politician in certain types of jobs. Whether the overall effect on wages is positive or negative is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, losing an election may reduce the value of the politician in jobs where popularity is important (such as being a spokesperson for a company). On the other hand, exiting Congress voluntarily may signal the politician's desire to "slow down" and hence reduce the perceived value of the politician to potential employers.
A third option upon exit is retirement. In this case, the politician may (depending on age and length of service) receive congressional pension payments whose value depends on his/her employment history. We describe the congressional pension rules in detail in the paper. Here, we just write the pension rule as:
(2) ) , , ( it it it it TS TH Age f PE = which indicates that the pension payment PE it that individual i will begin to receive if he/she retires at time t depends on his/her age as well as terms in the House and Senate. Then, the payoff in the retirement option is:
The parameter α L captures the monetized value of leisure. The parameter α VE captures an additional monetized value of leisure for people who exit Congress voluntarily rather than via losing an election. For instance, α VE > 0 captures the notion that those who exit voluntarily desire to "slow down," so that their value of leisure after exiting congress is relatively high. This parameter enables us to capture a prominent feature of the data: those who exit Congress voluntarily are much more likely to choose retirement as a post-congressional option than further employment, even conditional on age and other observed characteristics.
Equations (1) and (3) give the per-period payoffs for each of the three post-congressional alternatives. We now describe the present value of the utility stream from each option. As noted previously, we do not model behavior beyond the first choice that the politician makes after leaving Congress. Rather, we assume that exogenous death and retirement transition probabilities govern outcomes from that point onward. Specifically, if the politician chooses employment option j, for j = 1,2, then he/she will remain in that alternative until either retirement or death. Once the politician enters retirement he/she stays in that state until death. Let π r (t), and π d (t) be the retirement probability and death probability, respectively. These are written as functions of t to allow them to depend on the age at exit from Congress. 5 Letting δ denote the per-period discount factor, the present discounted value of private sector employment can be written:
while, for the public sector, we have:
In equation (5), α 2W is a parameter that captures the additional utility from holding another political job. Given that politicians get non-pecuniary rewards from being in Congress, it seems reasonable to assume they may also get non-pecuniary rewards from other political jobs. The parameters α 1C and α 2C capture the monetized value of having served on a major House committee, which could generate additional income from speaking engagements, consulting, book contracts and other similar activities. We allow the value from these activities (which we do not observe) to differ depending on whether the politician's post-congressional occupation is in the private or public sector. Similarly, the present discounted value of the retirement option is:
5 In our empirical work we also let them vary with age after exit from Congress, but it simplifies the exposition to ignore this.
We also assume there is an idiosyncratic (politician specific) taste shock associated with each post-congressional option. Thus, the overall values of the three options may be written V j = PV j + ξ j for j = 1,2,3. We assume the vector ξ it = (ξ i1t , ξ i2t , ξ i3t ,) is i.i.d type I extreme value with standard deviation ρ E . Following Rust (1987) , this assumption allows us to form simple expressions for the choice probabilities and the expected maximum value of the exit options, which we now describe.
We assume that politicians do not see the vector of taste shocks ξ it prior to exiting Congress. 6 Nor, as noted earlier, do they see the stochastic component of wage draws ε it = (ε i1t , ε i2t ). Upon deciding to exit, the ε it and ξ it values are revealed, and the politician chooses the alternative with the highest value. Therefore, in order to form the expected value of the option to exit Congress, the politician must form the expected maximum over the payoff draws for all three alternatives (integrating over the ε it and ξ it ).
To achieve a more compact notation, let XP it denote the set of state variables that are relevant for the determination of post-congressional payoffs. We have:
Then, we write the present value of the employment and retirement options as:
This type of independence assumption is crucial for the type of solution method developed by Rust (1987) . However, one might expect politicians who voluntarily exit congress to have a higher value of leisure, on average, and to therefore have relatively high values of ξ i3t , making them more likely to choose retirement as the postcongressional option. This is precisely the sort of dependence that our parameter α VE captures, since it can be interpreted as letting the mean of ξ i3t be conditioned on VE it . In general, as Rust has noted, letting distributions of the stochastic terms be conditioned on lagged observables is the ideal way to relax the strength of the independence assumptions underlying his approach. The parameters α 1C , α 2C and α 2W play a similar role in our model.
to highlight the fact that the present values of wages in post-congressional employment options depend on the state variables XP it , which are known at the time of the decision to exit Congress, and the stochastic terms ε it , which are not.
The expected value of the decision to exit Congress can then be written: Given this structure, we also obtain simple expressions for the probability that each postcongressional alternative is chosen. Let d ikt be an indicator variable equal to 1 if option k is chosen and 0 otherwise, where k = 1 denotes the private sector, k = 2 denotes the public sector, and k = 3 denotes retirement. Then, the probability that politician i decides to retire is simply:
If the politician chooses employment in either the private or public sector, a wage is observed, so we must form a choice probability conditional on the wage in order to obtain the appropriate likelihood function contribution (see equation (34) in Section 6, which describes the construction of the likelihood function).
Decisions of Senators
In this section we consider the decisions of a sitting senator. 1947-1965, 1967-1975 or 1977-1993 
The first four terms in (14) capture the immediate payoff from staying in the Senate at time t. W S (t) is the wage the senator will receive, and the term α S captures the monetized value of the per-period non-pecuniary rewards from being in the Senate. While all senators receive these rewards, those of the type who value personal legislative achievements (i.e., Achieve i = 1) may also receive additional utility in any given period while sitting in the Senate if he/she achieves an important legislative accomplishment in that period. We denote the probability of a policy achievement by a senator by p AS (XS it ), and α AS is the monetized value of the utility the achievement generates.
11 The term µ 1Sit is a stochastic component to i's utility from being in the Senate at time t. This may capture random fluctuations in the non-pecuniary rewards over time.
The last term in (14) captures the future component of the value from staying in the Senate. This is equal to the discount factor, δ, times the probability of survival to the next decision period, (1-π d (t)), times the expected value of the state the politician will arrive at in period t+1 given survival, EV (XS i, t+1 , s) . Given (7) and (13), we see that:
10 Wage paths were very similar for members within each entering cohort defined here, regardless of entry year. Thus, we constructed cohort specific wage paths using time-specific averages across the cohort members. If we let each entering class be its own cohort (i.e., have its own wage path), it drastically expands the state space, and increases computational time. This cost did not appear justified given the limited variation of wages within cohorts. 11 The assumption that only "achievers" derive utility from accomplishments guarantees that α S and α AS are separately identified. Otherwise, identification would hinge subtly on variation of p AS , the probability of achievement, with XS it .. it is serially independent we follow convention and do enter it explicitly in our value function expressions).
We next develop the expression for EV (XS i, t+1 , s), the expected value of the next period state, should the senator remain in the Senate. First, suppose that SOS i,t+1 and SOW t+1 are known, so that the only uncertainty is with regard to µ 1Si,t+1 . At time t+1 the politician will again choose whether to stay in the Senate or exit, so EV(
and V E (XP i, t+1 ). If we put the model in a form in which V S and V E both have additive independent type I extreme value error terms, then we can again use Rust's (1987) close-form formula for the expected maximum. Although V E does not have an error term, we can achieve an equivalent representation by assuming that µ 1Si,t+1 is equal to the difference of two independent type I extreme value error terms, each with standard deviation ρ 1S . Then we have:
. Then, to form expected value functions that are not conditional on SOS i,t+1 and SOW t+1 , we simply take a weighted average of expressions like (16), each calculated at a different realization for SOS i,t+1 and SOW t+1 , and weighted by the probability of that realization conditional on SOS it and SOW t , respectively.
Given this structure, we also obtain simple expressions for the probability that each alternative is chosen. Let k it d be an indicator variable equal to 1 if option k is chosen and 0 otherwise, where k = S,E. Then, e.g., the probability that the senator decides to remain in the Senate is simply:
There is no important difference in the decisions of senators when ST = 2, except that, at that point, the future component of the value of the stay in Senate option is an expected maximum over the run for reelection and exit options, rather than the stay in Senate and exit options. Also, we let the standard deviation of the taste shocks differ at each value of ST, so ρ 2S
replaces ρ 1S in all relevant expressions. Now we describe the senator's decision when ST = 3. At that point the senator's seat is up for election, and he/she has the options of running for reelection or leaving Congress. If he/she decides to run, the probability of winning is p s (XS it ). 13 We allow the probability of winning to potentially depend on all the senator's state variables (including the unobserved skilltype), as discussed in Section 4. Note that we do not model the outcome of primaries and general elections separately. If a senator loses a bid for reelection we do not distinguish if this was due to losing a primary or a general election.
If the senator wins the reelection bid, then he/she will sit in the Senate for two years, and then make a decision regarding whether to continue. A rather subtle point with regard to timing in the model is thus that the senator, at the time he/she decides whether to run for reelection,
does not yet know the draw µ 1Sit+1 for utility from continuing to sit in the Senate that will be revealed when ST = 1. Thus, the expected payoff to winning is given by the expected value of (14):
Then we have: 13 We assume the Senator decides whether to run before the random variable Scandal it is realized. Thus, the decision to run is based on a probability of wining that is the weighted average of the probabilities with and without a scandal. We fix the probability of a scandal at 0.0049 in the Senate, which is equal to the frequency in the data.
This says that the value of running for the Senate is equal to the probability of winning times the expected value of sitting in the Senate for the next period, plus the probability of losing times the value of exit (recall that a senator who loses a reelection bid then makes a post-congressional career decision), plus the term (α RS + µ RSit ). Here, α RS is the mean utility a senator gets from running for the Senate (which may be positive or negative, and whose sign is not obvious a priori), and µ RSit is the idiosyncratic component of the utility of running for reelection, which is specific to senator i at time t. Finally, XP it * denotes the XP it sub-vector of XS it with VE it set to 0, since the senator exits via losing rather than voluntarily.
Letting µ RSit be the difference of two independent type I extreme value error terms, each with standard deviation ρ RS , we then have:
. The choice probability expressions are similar to (17). Clearly, the value of a House seat may be enhanced substantially if it is likely that the holder of that seat will have an option to run for Senate with a reasonably large probability of winning in the not too distant future. Thus, a key aspect of the representative's problem is to forecast when Senate seats in his/her state will be up for election, whether an incumbent will be running when a seat does come up, and the incumbent's party affiliation. The problem is complicated by the fact that each state has two senators. Furthermore, it is uncertain when (and if) Senate seats will become open, because senators may die in office, leave the Senate before the end of their terms or decide not to run when their terms run out. 14 Clearly, a senator's decision to not seek reelection may depend on the identity of the representatives who may seek election to the Senate as well as on the decisions of other senators. Similarly, a representative's decision to run for the Senate may depend on whether other representatives from the same state are likely to do the same and on their identity. These considerations suggest that strategic interactions may play an important role and the decisions of all politicians may be viewed as outcomes of a dynamic game among the members of Congress. While certainly valuable such an extension is clearly beyond the scope of our analysis and in this paper we abstract from all strategic considerations. the first seat scheduled to come up for election has an incumbent Republican, while the next has an incumbent Democrat. 
Decisions of Representatives
The specification of these probabilities, which are constructed using empirical frequencies from our data set, is discussed more fully in Section 4. in 1947-1965, 1967-1975 or 1977-1993 . As we noted when discussing senators, one reason we include this state variable is to capture changes in congressional wages over time. Cohort is important for representatives for an additional reason. As is well known, House reelection probabilities have changed over time. A preliminary analysis of our data suggested clear breaks between these cohorts. Thus we include Cohort in the reelection probability functions that we discuss in Section 4.
The timing of events in the decision process for a representative is as follows. At the end of his/her two-year term, the representative decides whether to exit, run for reelection, or, if the option is available, run for Senate. At the time this decision is made, the politician knows the state of his/her district (SOD), as well as SOS and SOW for the upcoming election. The representative also knows whether a Senate seat is up for election, whether an incumbent will run for the seat, and, if so, the party of that incumbent. All these variables, along with the stochastic realizations of Redist and Scandal, affect his/her reelection chances. If the politician decides to run for the House or Senate, he/she then gets a draw from a probability distribution that determines the election outcome. If the politician wins reelection to the House, he/she then gets a draw from a probability distribution that determines if he/she is made a member of a major committee. There is also the possibility that the representative will achieve an important legislative accomplishment. Then the process repeats itself. On the other hand, if the politician loses, then he/she chooses an exit option, and the process terminates. Now consider a sitting representative's decision when ES = 2, 3 or 4, so that the option of running for Senate is available. The other two options are to run for reelection or to exit
Congress. The value of running for Senate is:
where h indicates that the politician is sitting in the House. Equation (23) resembles equation (19) , the value to a sitting senator of running for Senate, except that: (i) the probability of winning, p HS (XH it ), is different (in particular, it also depends on whether an incumbent senator is running for the seat), and (ii) we allow the direct utility or disutility to a representative from running for a Senate seat, (α HS + µ HSit ), to differ from the utility or disutility that a sitting senator would receive. The probability that a representative wins a bid for a Senate seat is more complex than the probability a senator wins reelection, because p HS (XH it ) depends not just on the representative's characteristics, the state of the state, and the state of the world, but also on whether an incumbent senator is running for the seat. We describe p HS (XH it ) in detail in Section 4.
The value of running for reelection to the House is:
Here, p H (XH it ) is the probability of winning reelection to the House, which we describe more fully in Section 4.
16 As was the case with Senate elections, we do not model the outcome of House primaries and general elections separately. The term α RH is the mean value of the direct utility that the representative gets from running for the House (which may be positive or negative, and whose sign is not obvious a priori), while µ RHit is the idiosyncratic component of the utility of running for reelection, which is specific to House member i at time t.
The expected value of sitting in the House given reelection at time t is:
The first four terms in (25) capture the current component of the payoff from sitting in the house at time t. W H (t) is the wage, and α H is the monetized value of the utility of sitting in the House. The parameter α C is the monetized values of the utility of being named to a major House committee and is multiplied by the probability of being named to a major House committee, p C (XH it * ), to get the expected utility. 17 A representative of the type that values personal 16 The probability of winning for a representative will depend both on the realization of Scandal it and whether he/she is subject to redistricting. But we assume a representative decides whether to run before these are realized. Thus, the probability of winning in (24) is an unconditional probability integrated over the realizations of Redist it and Scandal it . The probability of redistricting is set at 0.2628, and the probability of a scandal in the House is set at 0.0080, which are equal to the frequencies in the data. 17 At this point it is worth recalling that in equation (7) legislative achievements (i.e., Achieve i = 1) may also receive additional utility that is contingent on having an important legislative accomplishment in that period. We denote the probability of a political achievement by a representative by p AH (XH it ), while α AH is the monetized value of the utility increment generated by an achievement. Expected utility from legislative achievement is the product of these terms.
18
The last term in (25) is the future component, which consists of the discount factor times the probability of survival to the next decision period, times the expected value of the state the representative will occupy at time t+1 when he/she next makes decisions about exiting Congress or running for office. This expectation is taken over five pieces of information that will be revealed after the representative is reelected at t but before he/she makes time t+1 decisions, and that affect the values that he/she will assign to the various choice options at t+1. These are whether the representative gets selected for a major committee after his/her reelection, along with SOS and SOW for the time t+1 election, and the status of the two Senate seats in his/her state at the time of the t+1 election. 
In the term EV (XH i, t+1 , h), the state variables COM, SOW, SOS, ES and INC are all conditioned on, so the expectation is taken only over the draws for the time t+1 taste shocks for running for House and Senate, µ HSi,t+1 and µ RHi, t+1 , which the politician cannot anticipate at time t, the possibility of a legislative achievement at time t+1, and the possibilities of a scandal and redistricting at t+1. If ES = l , where l = 2, 3 or 4, so that the option to run for Senate is available, then this has the form: 18 The assumption that only "achievers" derive utility from accomplishments guarantees that α H and α AH are separately identified. Otherwise, identification would hinge subtly on variation of p AH , the probability of achievement, with XH it . 19 Note that legislative accomplishments are also revealed between re-election and the time t+1 decision. But utility from these accomplishments is derived instantaneously during the representative's term, and so legislative accomplishments have no bearing on decisions at time t+1. Also, note that the values of Redist and Scandal at t+1 are not realized until after the time t+1 decision is made. , and we specify that µ HSi,t+1 = ζ 1it -ζ 3it and µ RHi,t+1 = ζ 2it -ζ 3it , where ζ 1it , ζ 2it and ζ 3it are mutually independent type I extreme value error terms. These have standard deviation ρ 2H , ρ 3H or ρ 4H , depending on whether ES = 2, 3 or 4. This distributional assumption allows us to again apply the Rust (1987) formula to achieve a simple close-form expression for the expected maximum.
Finally, given our distributional assumptions on the taste shocks, the probabilities that the representative chooses each of the three options at time t have simple forms. Let k it d be an indicator variable equal to 1 if option k is chosen and 0 otherwise, where k = RH, RS, E. Then, e.g., the probability that the representative decides to run for the Senate is simply:
where l = 2, 3, or 4, depending on whether ES = 2, 3, or 4.
It is straightforward to work out the relevant value functions and probability expressions for a sitting representative's decision when ES = 1, where the option of running for Senate is not available. This simply involves working through the same steps as above with the terms involving V RS eliminated where appropriate and ρ 1H replacing H l ρ .
Probability Functions and Evolution of Exogenous State Variables
In Sections 1 through 3 we have referred to functions that determine the probabilities of winning elections, achieving important legislative achievements and being named to a major House committee, and the evolution of the exogenous state variables SOS it , SOW it , INC it , and ES it . In this section we describe the specifications we use in our analysis.
First consider Senate elections. The probability that a senator wins reelection or that a representative wins election to the Senate may be conveniently specified to have a logit form. In the first expression in equation (30) we have HSE it = 0, while in the second expression we have that HSE it = 1. This specification allows the probabilities to depend on age, and previous congressional experience as captured by past terms in the House and Senate, as well as by the state of the state and the state of the world in terms of whether it is a good, bad or neutral for Democrats. 20 Importantly, note that we let the intercept term in (29) depend on Skill i , thus allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the probability of winning. Analogous to the wage function intercepts, one may think of the probability of winning function intercepts as differing because politicians have different endowments of political campaigning skills. We interpret Skill as capturing both occupational skill endowments and campaigning skill endowments. A key advantage of our framework is that it allows us to obtain estimates of the parameters of probability of winning functions like (29) that are adjusted both for such unobserved heterogeneity and for the selection bias created by politicians' decisions about whether to run.
Similarly, in order to specify the probability that a representative wins reelection to the House, define the latent index U Hit by the equation: where ν Hit is another standard logistic error term. As we discussed earlier, we included cohort effects in (31) because prior research and our own preliminary data analysis suggested these are important. The expression for the probability of winning election to a House seat, p H (XH it ), is then similar to the ones in (30). 21 Similarly, the probability that a representative is named to a major House committee after being elected to the House can also be conveniently specified to have a logit form. Define the 
where ν Cit is another standard logistic error term. Again, the expression for the probability of being named to a major House committee, p C (XH it * ), is similar to the one in (30). Like the probability of winning functions, this function also allows for heterogeneity in the intercepts, so that the probability of being named to a committee may also depend on the politician's skilltype.
The probability functions of achieving important legislative accomplishments by representatives and senators, p AH (XH it ) and p AS (XS it ), are also specified to have a logistic form.
To minimize the number of additional parameters that need to be estimated, we adopt a simple specification where p AH is only a function of Achieve, TH, Party and COM, and p AS of Achieve, TS and Party. In particular, unobserved heterogeneity in preferences affects the probability of achieving important legislative accomplishments, and we assume that only "achievers" can obtain such accomplishments. . Of the 768 elements in this transition matrix, only 240 are feasible and, within this subset, only 56 are positive. Note that, unlike the probabilities of winning elections or being appointed to committees, it is assumed that these probabilities do not depend on unobserved heterogeneity and are not affected by selection. Thus, rather than impose any structure on these probabilities, we estimate them in an unrestricted way from the data. We then treat those values as known in the solution and estimation of our model.
The transition probabilities for SOS and SOW are also assumed to evolve according to two (independent) Markov processes with transition probabilities P(SOS i,t+1 |SOS it ) and P(SOW t+1 |SOW t ), respectively. Again, we estimate these probabilities in an unrestricted way from the empirical transition frequencies, and use those values in estimation. The same is true for the death probabilities, π d , which are also estimated from the data for each age in an unrestricted way. Since information on retirement from post-congressional occupations is for the most part unavailable, the same procedure cannot be used to obtain estimates of the retirement probabilities, π r . Instead, we specify a logistic form for retirement probabilities after age 60: and estimate the parameters π 0 and π 1 jointly with the other parameters of the model (we assume that the retirement probability before age 60 is equal to zero).
Computational Issues
Estimation of a model like that described above proceeds iteratively. Given an initial guess for the values of the complete vector of model parameters, one solves the DP problem at those values. Then, given the solution of the DP problem, the likelihood is straightforward to construct, because, as we have seen, the choice probabilities are rather simple expressions, as are the wage densities for the wage data at the point of exit from Congress. At that point one forms derivatives of the likelihood, and determines a step for updating the parameter vector. Once the parameter vector is updated, one solves the DP problem again, obtains a new likelihood, and determines another step. And so on.
The computational problem in estimating this type of model arises because hundreds or thousands of steps are typically required before the search algorithm converges to an optimum.
And, on each step, the DP problem must be solved again at a new parameter vector. Thus, it must be possible to solve the DP problem quickly if estimation is to be feasible. Computational time depends critically on the size of the state space, since the value of each possible state must be computed to solve the DP problem.
In spite of the fact that the DP problem described above is very large in terms of the size of the state space, our distributional assumptions allow us to obtain an "exact" solution. This means that we are able to calculate the value functions at every point in the state space, and we do not resort to approximate solution methods such as those described in Keane and Wolpin (1994) or Rust (1997) , in which one only solves for value functions at randomly selected subsets of the state points and then interpolates to the remaining points. 23 Given the large number of state variables in our model, and hence the large size of the state space, it is rather unusual that we can adopt an exact approach of solving at every state point. Thus, in this section, we provide some discussion of how this is feasible.
Consider the size of the state space. In period t = 23, politicians can be in approximately 300,000 states, given our specification of the state space. This is the largest size that the state space ever takes on. In period t = 24 the size of the state space falls, because politicians know that if they are elected to Congress at t = 24 they will have to exit at t = 25 (when they reach 80).
Thus, variables which enter the state space at t only because they are relevant for forecasting the opportunity for running for higher office or getting re-elected at t+1 are irrelevant at t = 24. At t = 25, when agents must exit Congress, the state space becomes much smaller, because many of the state variables are not relevant to V E (XP it ), the value of exiting Congress. The relevant set of state variables, XP it , is a rather small subset of the complete set of state variables. In fact, we calculate that at t = 25 politicians can only be in about 1,800 different states that are relevant to post-congressional payoffs.
When we sum over all periods t = 1,…,25, we calculate that there are approximately 4 million points in the entire state space, but only about 24,000 points in the state sub-space spanned by the state variables in XP. The fact that the number of possible values of the vector of state variables XP it that are relevant to post-congressional payoffs is (relatively) small is crucial to our being able to solve the DP problem exactly. The most computationally burdensome part of the solution of the DP problem is the evaluation of the integrals in (10), and this only needs to be done at this rather small subset of state points.
In general, in our exposition of the model, we showed how only certain subsets of the complete state space, which we denoted by XP, XH, XS, and XH * , were relevant for decisionmaking in various contexts. Most of the calculations needed to solve the DP problem only need to be done at the state points in one of these subsets. Then, these sub-calculations can be added up (a fast operation) to form the value functions at all points in the complete state space.
Next we consider the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the model. A difficulty that arises in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity is that the DP problem must be solved for each type of agent. In forming the likelihood one then weights choice probabilities conditional on the agent being each type by the probability the agent is each type. The need to solve the DP problem for each type makes it infeasible to assume a continuous distribution of types or even a large, discrete number of types. It was computationally feasible to estimate our model with four types.
The Likelihood Function
It is useful to write the likelihood function in terms of separate components. The likelihood contribution at exit is:
Here, the first term is the likelihood contribution if the politician takes a job in the private sector (j = 1) or in the public sector (j = 2).
( ) it j XP | ⋅ φ denotes the wage density in sector j. This term only enters the likelihood for the subset (42%) of observations where we observe the wage. o it is a dummy variable which indicates if the wage is observed. The second term is the likelihood contribution if the politician retires (j = 3). Note that XP it is the same regardless of whether the politician exits Congress voluntarily (VE it = 1) or via losing an election (VE it = 0), except for the component VE it (see equation (7)). Note that all the components of XP it are observed by the econometrician except for Skill i . For our further exposition of the likelihood function, it will be useful to make the dependence of E it L on VE it and Skill i explicit by writing
Next, consider the likelihood contribution for a sitting senator at time t. Recall that if ST it = 1 or 2 the senator's choice is to stay in the Senate or exit Congress. If ST it = 3 then it is the end of the senator's six-year term and the choice is to run for reelection or exit Congress. If ST it = 3 then we have:
Here we have defined Type i = (Skill i , Achieve i ). The first term in (35) is the likelihood contribution if the senator runs for reelection. In this case, he/she will either win (WIN it = 1) or lose (LOSE it = 1). If the politician wins (i.e., WIN it = 1), the winning probability p S (XS it ) enters the expression. In addition, there will then be a realization for whether the politician attains a major legislative accomplishment in the next Congress. The term
is the likelihood contribution that derives from this event. It is defined as:
Thus, if the politician wins and he/she is the achiever type (Achieve i = 1), this additional likelihood contribution involves the probability of an achievement p AS (XS it ) and an indicator, which we denote ACH it , for whether an achievement is realized. Returning to the main expression in (35), we note that, in the event of a loss, the senator exits Congress, and gets the 
1 or 2, so that the senator is simply deciding whether to continue serving for the next two years,
we have the simpler expression:
Next, consider the likelihood contribution of a sitting member of the House at time t. In the case that ES it = 2, 3 or 4, so that the option to run for Senate is available, this is:
The first term is the likelihood contribution if the House member runs for reelection. In this case, he/she will either win or lose. In the event of a win, the representative will receive a draw for whether he/she is appointed to a major House committee, and whether he/she attains a major legislative accomplishment during the next term. The term
is the likelihood contribution that derives from the realizations of these events. It is defined as:
for k = 0,1 denote the likelihood contributions from achievement given that the politician was not or was named to a major committee, respectively. Recall that the probability of achievement in the House depends on whether the representative is a member of a major committee. The expression for ) ,
is similar to equation (36) We allow the probabilities that a politician is each of the four possible types to depend on a set of six background characteristics that we assume are exogenous. These are the following:
Enter Senate is a dummy equal to 1 if the person starts his/her career in the Senate; Age at Entry indicates the member's age when they first enter Congress; Family is an indicator for whether an individual has relatives who had served in Congress; Home is an indicator for whether an individual serves in the same state where he/she was born; Polexp is an indicator for whether an individual had political experience prior to entering Congress; and Party is an indicator of the politician's party (1 if a Republican, 0 if a Democrat). The variables Family, Home, Polexp, Enter Senate and Age at Entry are not state variables in our model. However, we use them, together with party affiliation, to help predict the unobservable type of a politician. Specifically, we assume that the probability that Skill i = 1 and the probability that Achieve i = 1 are logistic functions of these six variables. The probability that a politician is each of the four types can then be calculated by appropriately multiplying together the probabilities that he/she is a "skilled" type and an "achiever" type. 
We maximized the log likelihood function using the BHHH algorithm.
Data Description
We construct a data set containing detailed information on careers of all House Laumann, the imputed wages for each of the relevant individuals in our sample were adjusted to account for the actual location of their practice. To make this adjustment we used data on billing rates for partners in law firms in different U.S. cities that we obtained from various issues of the Lawyer's Almanac. We then computed the ratios of average billing rates in each U.S. city relative to Chicago and multiplied the estimated wage for each individual by the appropriate coefficient depending of the location of their practice. 31 It is important to note 28 Law schools are coded as "elite" or "prestigious" according to whether they are ranked in the top-ten or toptwenty schools, respectively, in the U.S. News and World Report surveys. Also note that the data used by Sandefur and Laumann does not contain information on congressional experience. 29 Recent editions of the archive are available online at http://www.martindale.com. For earlier years, printed editions of the archive were used. In some cases we used phone interviews to determine the year when an individual had joined a law firm and their position within the firm. 30 Most of these directories are available online. Printed editions are also available for each state. 31 If the location of the law practice was not known we used the billing rates for the closets city to the place of residence.
that although our procedure for imputing post-congressional wages in the private sector has limitations (for example, it is likely to understate the actual variation in wages), it nevertheless allows us to capture important features of the data. A key observation is that by and large, when former members of Congress work as lawyers or lobbyists, they are hired as partners of the firms they join (which entails a substantial wage premium over associates positions), in spite of the fact that their experience as lawyers or lobbyists would typically not justify their being offered these positions. In other words, individuals with a similar vector of characteristics (ignoring congressional experience) would not be partners in the data set used by Sandefur and Laumann. Thus, we expect that the effect of congressional experience on one's post-congressional wage (as a lawyer) will largely be captured by the effect of this experience on the chances of being made a partner. There are two other important related observations. First, the variance of wages of partners within law firms is rather small (which is due to the fact that partners share profits). Second, the variance of wages of partners across law firms is in large part explained by differences in location, size and field of practice (which are all factors we take into account in our imputation procedure, and which congressional experience presumably affects as well). The residual variation in wages, however, is clearly not zero, and hence the wage imputation procedure we use will in general understate the actual variation in wages.
(ii) Public Sector: To obtain the annual salary of individuals who served in a federal public office in the first year after leaving Congress we used the relevant sections of 34 These cutoffs again generate a distribution with roughly a third of observations in each 32 All nominal figures were converted into 1995 dollars using the CPI deflator. 33 We use the overall House vote rather than the presidential vote for two reasons. First, the presidential vote occurs only every four years. Second, the presidential vote may be dominated by the particular personalities of the presidential candidates, and not accurately reflected circumstances in local elections. In contrast, the cumulative House vote should not be dominated by individual personalities. 34 Here we use the presidential vote rather than the state-wide House shares because state-wide House vote shares may be dominated by local personalities, especially in states with only a few congressional districts. We hope the range. Finally, to construct SOD, which is a (constant over time) measure of the typical political climate in a district, we first construct the intermediate variable ASOD using the same procedure we used to construct SOS, except that it is based on the district level presidential vote relative to the national vote. Next, to convert this to a constant over time measure, we use the following procedure: For each representative i we compute the average difference between SOS it and ASOD it over his/her career horizon and we classify a district as good for Democrats relative to the State the district belongs to (SOD = 3) if the average difference is greater than 0.25, as bad (SOD = 1) if it less than -0.25, and as neutral (SOD = 2) otherwise. These cutoffs again generate a distribution with roughly a third of observations in each range. Finally, note that although we assume that the state of the district a representative is in remains constant over his/her time horizon, the state of a district is allowed to change as the identity of the representative of that district changes.
influence of the personalities of particular presidential candidates cancel out when we take the difference in state vs. national presidential votes.
